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House Divided Chapter Three Openness Futurism “Reformed” Open Theist Richard Pratt Vs. Full Preterist Edward J. Hassertt

House Divided Bridging the Gap in Reformed Eschatology A Preterist

Response to When Shall These Things Be?


Chapter Three

Openness Futurism


Edward J. Hassertt

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According to Dr. Richard Pratt, one of the central errors of preterists

is our belief “that all biblical predictions must be fulfilled just as

they are stated” (WSTTB, 121). In contrast to the teachings of preterists,

Pratt says that the prophetic predictions of the Bible are “seldom

fulfilled exactly as they are given” (122). In fact, “true prophets,” he says,

“often predicted things that did not happen” at all (131).


According to Pratt, the reason that biblical prophecies failed to be

fulfilled is because human choices intervened and played a major role

in determining how or if the predictions would be fulfilled (123, 126).

Therefore, concludes Pratt, “it does not matter if the Scriptures depict

Christ’s second coming in close proximity to his first coming. . . . [H]is

return could still be in our future, even two thousand years later” (122).


Pratt begins his chapter, “Hyper-Preterism and Unfolding Biblical

Eschatology,” lamenting that many Christians endorse “the hyper-preterist

proposal” that the predictions of true prophets are fulfilled just

as they were stated (122). He complains that it is “quite common” for

evangelicals to agree with “the hyper-preterist interpretation” of Deuteronomy

18:22 (122–123):


If what a prophet proclaims in the name of the Lord does not

take place or come true, that is a message the Lord has not spoken.

That prophet has spoken presumptuously. Do not be afraid

of him.


Many or most Christians, including preterists, believe this verse to

be saying that if a prophet makes a prediction in the name of Yahweh

and the thing predicted does not take place or come true, then the prediction

was not a message that Yahweh had spoken. Pratt says that this

interpretation is not “subtle” enough (122–123).


Halfway through his chapter, Pratt, in one paragraph, explains his

interpretation of this verse. He says that different prophetic predictions

were meant to be taken in different ways and indicated various levels of

determination of God to direct the future. Almost none of God’s predictions

in the Bible, according to Pratt, offered absolute certainty that

they would be fulfilled. Thus, a true prophet passed the test of Deuteronomy

18:22 “so long as historical events took place that matched the

level of certainty that their predictions offered” (137).


Although Pratt does not say so, this interpretation of Deuteronomy

18:22 means that if a false prophet uttered a prediction in the name of

Yahweh and the prediction failed to come to pass, the false prophet and

the people could simply say: “The fact that this prediction in the name

of Yahweh did not come to pass only proves that this was a typical prediction

of God. He simply did not have a high level of determination to

direct the future when He made this prediction.” No one could prove or

disprove this argument if Pratt’s interpretation is true. Pratt thus renders

Deuteronomy 18:22 practically useless and ultimately meaningless.


Pratt versus Reformed Theology


Not surprisingly, Pratt attempts to dissociate his view from Open

Theism[1] and to connect it instead to traditional Reformed theology

(123–124). He does this by affirming God’s sovereign immutability,

and by affirming that everything that takes place in the universe is part

of God’s eternal plan (124–125).


He also reminds the reader of the Reformed teaching that God’s immutability

does not mean that He is unchangeable in every way imaginable.

While God does not change in such things as His Being, character,

attributes, eternal counsel/plan/purposes, and promises, God does

change in the sense that He has meaningful interactions with and relationships

with man. He is actively involved in history. He lives our life

with us. He judges us, redeems us, and answers our prayers. He also

changed in that He “became flesh” (124–125).


This is all well and good and perfectly in line with Reformed theology.

But Pratt subtly shifts this Reformed teaching into the area of prophecy

fulfillment. It is at this point in his chapter that Pratt begins his defense

against preterism in earnest. And according to the pattern of WSTTB, he

begins his arguments with a creed, instead of with Scripture (125):


Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decrees of God,

the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly;

yet, by the same providence, He ordereth them to fall out according

to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely,

or contingently. (The Westminster Confession of Faith, 5.2)


The illusion that Pratt attempts to create by referencing this section

of the Confession is that it says anything about prophecy or the end

times. But of course, it does not. This section of the Confession deals

only with God’s eternal decrees made within the Godhead. Nowhere

does it address prophetic predictions. Pratt also attempts to use the

scriptural proof text that the Confession uses (Isa. 10:6–7) in order to

validate his view that God causes His own prophetic predictions to fail

(126, 152), but that scripture in no way suggests what Pratt contends.


Sawing Off The Limb He is Sitting On


Pratt begins his attempt to prove his view through Scripture exegesis on

pages 127–128, by using Jeremiah 18:7–10:


The instant I speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom,

to pluck up, or to break down, or to destroy; if that nation

against whom I have spoken will turn from their evil, I will repent

of the evil that I thought to do to it. And the instant I speak

concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build and to

plant it; if it does evil in My eye, not to obey My voice, then I will

repent of the good which I had said to do good to it.


According to Pratt, this passage demonstrates that the prophets of

God often made predictions (of judgment or of salvation) that did not

come true, because the intervening historical contingencies of the people’s

repentance or of the people’s sin caused God to cancel or postpone

or change the fulfillment of the prophetic predictions.


What Pratt misses here is that Jeremiah 18:7–10 itself is a prophecy

which Pratt is assuming must be fulfilled just as it was given. The

irony is thick here. Pratt claims that preterists are wrong in their view

that prophetic predictions were always fulfilled as they were written,

because human action usually changed things so that the predictions

were not fulfilled as they were written. Yet to prove this claim, Pratt assumes

that Jeremiah 18 is fulfilled exactly as it was written.


According to the logic of Pratt’s scheme, God is or was likely to

change His mind about His prophetic prediction in Jeremiah 18 and

God could decide instead to never change His stated plans when nations

repent or sin. Yet illogically, Pratt argues with certainty that God,

according to the sure prediction of Jeremiah 18:7–10, causes His own

predictions to fail.


Pratt is like a radical anti-creedalist who illogically endorses a creed

(“all creeds are false”) to prove that all creeds are false. The anti-creedalist

must assume—based on nothing—that his own creed is correct in

order to reject all creeds. He does not realize that his anti-creedal position

invalidates his own creed. Likewise, Pratt is assuming—based on

nothing—that a biblical prophetic prediction (his proof text, Jer. 18:7–

10) is sure and certain in order to prove that all such predictions are

unsure and uncertain. Pratt does not realize that his position removes

all certainty from the very text he is using to prove his position.


Predictions versus Threats


As we can see, Pratt’s view is logically invalid at its exegetical inception.

But let us move on through the rest of his chapter and take a look at the

first specific example he gives of his notion that God’s prophetic predictions

usually failed to be fulfilled as they were written (152). His first

example is 2 Chronicles 12:5 (129), where the prophet Shemaiah said to

Rehoboam and to the leaders of Judah,


This is what the Lord says, You have abandoned me; therefore, I

now abandon you to Shishak.


As a result of this prophetic word, Rehoboam and the leaders of

Judah humbled themselves, and God did not destroy them through

Shishak but only caused them to be subject to him (2 Chron. 12:7–8).

Thus God did not abandon them to Shishak even though He said He

abandoned them to Shishak.


The second example Pratt uses for his prediction-failure doctrine

(130–131) is Jonah 3:4:


And Jonah began to enter into the city a day’s journey, and he

cried, and said, Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown.


As we know, because the city repented, Nineveh was not overthrown

(Jonah 3:7–10). Thus God did not overthrow Nineveh even

though He said that Nineveh would be overthrown.


Pratt’s conclusion when he puts Jeremiah 18:7–10; 2 Chronicles

12:5–8 and Jonah 3:4–10 together is that “true prophets often predicted

things that did not happen” (131).


While Pratt says that his view is “complex” (122), the cause of the

complexity (i.e., of his error) is surprisingly simple. His primary exegetical

mistake is reflected in his use of the word “prediction” (127–

131). Pratt acknowledges that the two prophetic utterances above were

“threats” of judgment. Though Pratt calls Shemaiah’s prophetic message

a “prediction” (129), Pratt nevertheless acknowledges that it was

“just a warning from God . . . of judgment that might come” (129–130).

Pratt misses the fact that if the prophetic word of Shemaiah was “just a

warning,” then it was not a prophetic “prediction.” There was therefore

no failed “prediction.”


Though Pratt says that Jonah made a “prediction,” he acknowledges

that the “prediction” was actually “a threatened judgment” (130–132).

Jonah was called to “preach” (warn/threaten) not to make a prediction.

There was therefore no failed “prediction.”


Incidentally, Pratt says that God delayed His predicted judgment

of Nineveh as a result of the repentance of the people (132). But there

was no delay, even as there was no prediction. Rather, God “relented

concerning the calamity which He had declared He would bring upon

them. And He did not do it” (Jonah 3:10). The judgment that came upon

Nineveh some generations later was unrelated to the judgment that

God threatened in Jonah’s day.


These passages of Scripture in no way show that a prophet of God

ever made a “prediction” that failed to come to pass. These were not

“predictions” at all. Even though Pratt acknowledges that these and

many other such words of the prophets were merely threats/warnings

or offers of blessings, he spends his chapter equivocating, calling those

threats and offers “predictions” when they were not.[2]


This is the source of Pratt’s confusion and the confusion he is sure to

cause his readers. When Pratt said that “true prophets often predicted

things that did not happen” (131), what he should have said is that God,

through the prophets, often threatened to do things and offered to do

things that He did not, in the end, do. This biblical and Reformed truth

is a far, far cry from Pratt’s doctrine that God prophetically “predicted”

things that did not and will not ever come to pass.


Contrary to Pratt, whenever prophets of God actually predicted

things, those things happened —100% of the time. How Pratt can put

the “warnings” and “offers” of the Bible in the same category as the predictions

of the Second Coming, resurrection of the dead, and judgment of all

men is mystifying.


On page 137, Pratt says,


From the viewpoint of hyper-preterism, the predominant

purpose of predictions in the Scriptures was prognostication.

Hyper-preterists assume that prophets intended to give foreknowledge

of things to come.


I am truly surprised that Pratt’s editor Keith Mathison allowed

these sentences to pass inspection and to be sent to print. Obviously

one of the main purposes of a prediction was prognostication. “Prediction”

means “prognostication.” And obviously the prophets intended

to give foreknowledge of things to come. Who could possibly

deny this?


What Pratt should have said in the first sentence is that the predominant

purpose of prophetic messages (threats of judgment and offers

of blessing) was not prognostication. And what he should have said

in the second sentence is that not every prophetic message contained

foreknowledge of things to come.


Haggai 2:21–23


On the thirteenth page of Pratt’s chapter, he finally reaches an actual, predictive,

decretive prophecy (not merely a solemn threat/warning or offer):


Speak to Zerubbabel governor of Judah saying, I am going

to shake the heavens and the earth. And I will overthrow the

thrones of kingdoms and destroy the power of the kingdoms of

the nations; and I will overthrow the chariots and their riders,

and the horses and their riders will go down, everyone by the

sword of another. On that day, declares the Lord of hosts, I will

take you, Zerubbabel, son of Shealtiel, My servant, declares the

Lord, and I will make you like a signet ring, for I have chosen

you, declares the Lord of hosts. (Haggai 2:21–23)


According to Pratt, the fulfillment of even this prophecy was conditioned

upon the obedience of the people. And not only that, says Pratt,

the prophecy failed to take place as it was written: “ . . . [T]hese things

did not happen to Zerubbabel. He never became the king over God’s

people, and the nations around Israel were not destroyed. Why was

this so? It was because the postexilic community failed to be obedient

to the Lord.” The disobedience of the people, according to Pratt, caused

the “postponing” of the fulfillment of the prophecy (133).


First of all, when God says, “On that day, declares Yahweh of hosts,

I will,” the decretive nature of the prophecy is established. There is no

condition, implicit or otherwise, in the prophecy. The prophecy was

sure to be accomplished as it is written, Pratt notwithstanding.

As for Pratt’s claim that Zerubbabel “never became the king over

God’s people,” the prophecy says nothing about Zerubbabel becoming

the king over God’s people. It says only that God would make him

like a signet ring.” This could possibly mean that Zerubbabel became

highly esteemed and exalted in the sight of God. And/Or the promise

to Zerubbabel could have been meant to refer to Christ, who was born

of the seed of Zerubbabel, who was of the seed of David. Either way,

there was no “postponing” of the prophecy.


But as is often the case, the biblical answer is the obvious answer,

and it is missed because it does not fit the futurist paradigm. The

prophecy of Haggai 2:6–9, 21–23 was fulfilled, in a “typical” sense, in

the lifetime of Zerubbabel. In about four years (“in a little while”) after

the prophecy was given, God overthrew all the nations, (He “shook the

heavens, the earth, the sea and the dry land”) and the desire or wealth

of all nations came, and the temple was filled with glory (with gold and

silver). (Compare Haggai 1:15; 2:10 and Ezra 6:15.)


This all took place when Darius King of Persia overturned Israel’s

enemies, who for years had been preventing the rebuilding of God’s

house. Darius decreed, “May God . . . overthrow any king or people who

lifts a hand to change this decree or to destroy this temple in Jerusalem

(Ezra 6:11–12). Darius forced Israel’s enemies themselves to pay the full

cost of the rebuilding, as well as the full cost of all the daily, priestly

services (Ezra 6:8–10).


The military and political power of Israel’s enemies was overthrown.

They had tried to turn the king against Israel (Ezra 5), but God turned

their own stratagems against them. He made them subservient to His

people, taking their own wealth for the building of His glorious, earthly

house. God had thus “moved heaven and earth” to keep the covenant

that He had made with His people through Moses (Ezra 6:18; Hag. 2:5).

The prophecy of Haggai 2:6–9; 21–23 also foreshadowed the fulfillment

of the better promise (Heb. 8:6) that was fulfilled in Christ’s generation.

Israel’s building of the greater, earthly house in Zerubbabel’s generation

was an example of the building of the true, heavenly “House” in Christ.


Within perhaps only four years (“in a little while”) after Hebrews

12:26 was written, God overthrew all the nations. He “shook the heavens,

the earth, the sea and the dry land.” The desire of all nations came,

and God’s Temple was filled with Glory.


This happened when God overturned His kingdom-enemies who,

in their persecution of the church, had furiously resisted the construction

of His new covenant temple (Eph. 2:21–22; I Peter 2:5). Despite

the rage of the enemies, God enlisted countless multitudes of them to

build His new House (Rom. 5:10; Col. 1:21; Rev. 5:9); and the enemies

who resisted to the end were crushed, and were cast out of the kingdom

in AD 70 (Matt. 8:12; 21:43; Lk. 13:28; Acts 4:25–28; Gal. 4:30; Rev. 3:9).

God “moved heaven and earth” to keep the covenant that He made

with His elect through the blood of Christ. Now the Father, the Son, and

the Holy Spirit dwell eternally in the universal church, which is the new

covenant House of promise (Jn. 14:23; Gal. 4:19; Eph. 2:21–22; 3:17; Col.

1:27; II Peter 1:19; Rev. 3:20; 21:2–3). Through the power of the eternal

gospel, the desire of the nations flows into “the more perfect tabernacle

today and forever (Heb. 9:11; Rev. 21:26–27), and God Himself is its

unfading Glory (Rev. 21:23). Amen.


Pratt’s Three Failed Eschatons


In the last thirteen pages of his chapter, Pratt descends into an exegetical

abyss from which, sadly, he never returns. On pages 141–143, he says

that, according to Jeremiah, the beginning and consummation of the

eschaton (the Last Days), the culmination of history, the restoration of

Israel and of the Davidic throne, the rebuilding of the temple, and the

defeat and gathering of the Gentiles were all supposed to take place after

the Babylonian Exile in about 538 BC. Pratt says that the prophets of that

generation expected that the eschatological hopes of Israel would be imminently



But alas, according to Pratt, Daniel observed the alleged “failure” of

the supposedly imminent restoration of all things that Jeremiah allegedly

predicted. Daniel, in the prophecy of “the seventy weeks,” allegedly revealed

that the fullness of the eschaton, which allegedly should have happened

in Daniel’s lifetime, was allegedly postponed/delayed for about 490

years “because of a lack of repentance” (144–145, 147, 149, 152).

However, according to Pratt, about twenty years after Daniel received

that prophecy, the blessings of the eschaton were “offered” yet

again through the predictions of Haggai and Zechariah (520–515 BC).

But evidently, there was again insufficient repentance for the predictions

to be fulfilled (146–147).


Then according to Pratt, five hundred years later in the New Testament

era, the consummation of the eschaton was “offered” again

(meaning predicted but not promised, in Prattian usage). But “the lack

of repentance within the covenant community caused an indefinite delay

of Christ’s return” (149).


Apparently there was no “Daniel” this time around to tell anyone

there was going to be a delay (as though Daniel ever suggested a delay in

the first place). There was however the writer of Hebrews, who said in

about AD 66 that Christ would “not delay” in His Parousia (Heb. 10:37).

But that must have been one of those “failed” predictions.


Pratt comments on Acts 3:19–20:


Repent therefore and return, that your sins may be wiped away,

in order that times of refreshing may come from the presence of

the Lord; and that He may send Jesus, the Christ appointed for

you. . . .


According to Pratt, Peter was saying that the imminent Second

Coming was a “conditional offer.” If those who were listening to him

repented, then there was a “hope”/“possibility” that it would happen in

their lifetime (150–151).


This interpretation however can be quickly dismissed. The Second

Coming in Christ’s generation was neither “conditional” nor an

“offer” nor a mere “possibility” that was contingent on human behavior.

The contingency was the elect being saved, and that work was of

the sovereign Spirit, not of man. Therefore the eschaton was going to

be fulfilled in the last days of the old covenant age no matter what men

would do to resist God’s purpose. There was absolutely no way to stop

the fulfillment of the Second Coming and resurrection of the dead in

the apostolic generation, Prattian contingencies and postponements



On page 134, Pratt says, “When a sign accompanied a prophecy, it

showed that God was very determined to carry out what the prophet

had predicted.” However, the prophetic time statements of the New

Testament were accompanied by signs. Yet Pratt claims that those

prophecies were all altered by human contingency.


Pratt says on page 135 that “when God adds an oath to a prophetic

prediction, it raises that prediction to the level of a covenantal certainty.

Pratt gives as an example, “There as surely as I live, declares the Sovereign

Lord . . . ” (Eze. 5:11). Yet when the Lord Jesus Christ Himself says,

Truly [Amen], I say unto you,” in regard to the timing of His Parousia

(Matt. 16:28), Pratt for some reason does not count Jesus’ promise there

as “a covenantal certainty.”


Pratt says on page 137 that the question of timing always remains

open in prophecies with oaths. Evidently, Pratt has never read Revelation

10:6: “and [the angel] swore by Him who lives forever and ever, who

created heaven and the things in it, and the earth and the things in it,

and the sea and the things in it, that there shall be delay no longer.”


Later in the apostolic generation, Pratt says, the apostles had to deal

with the unexpected delay of Christ’s return (despite the oath in RevelaOpenness

tion 10:6), and the Christian community was beset with “discouragement”

as a result of that delay (151–152). How Pratt knows about this

delay definitively within his system of contingency and ambiguity is a

mystery he does not solve. But, Pratt continues, Peter did not give up

hope, because he knew that God was showing great patience, not wanting

anyone to perish but desiring “everyone” to come to repentance

(152). And according to Pratt, this has been going on now for about

2,500 years, since the days of Daniel. Thus ends Pratt’s notable chapter.


The last thirteen pages of Pratt’s chapter certainly do not merit any

further refutation. His arguments are transparently wrong. The eschaton

was never scheduled to arrive in 538 BC in the time of Daniel. Nor was it

supposed to arrive in about 520 B.C. in the time of Haggai and Zechariah.

Nor was it merely “offered” conditionally in Christ’s generation.


If Pratt is correct, we must ask: Has the eschaton been “offered” at any

other times since the first century? Was it “offered” again in 1843, as per

William Miller? Was it “offered” again in 1988, as per Edgar Whisenant?

Was it “offered” again in 1994, as per Harold Camping? Were those the

failed predictions of men, or the failed predictions of God? Who can say

one way or the other with any certainty, in Pratt’s “Openness Futurism”?


It may seem difficult to imagine how someone who is a Doctor of

Theology could believe and teach such incredibly unbiblical things.

But the reason is apparent if we paraphrase Pratt’s argument: “Hyperpreterists

think that prophecies are fulfilled as they were written. But

according to my futurist paradigm, prophecies were not fulfilled as they

were written. I know they were not fulfilled as they were written because

they were not fulfilled as they were written, according to my futurist

paradigm. Therefore, hyper-preterists are wrong when they say

that prophecies are fulfilled as they were written.”


Circular arguments, ad hominems, and question begging, oh my!

Preterism, in contrast, walks by faith. If it appears that a divine prediction

was not fulfilled when and how God said it would be fulfilled,

then it is our interpretation of the prediction, not its fulfillment, which

must be called into question. Amen.


Pratt and Openness Theology


Pratt’s eschatological error is not merely one of many perfectly acceptable

options within futurism, as Mathison suggests in his chapter.


Pratt comes dangerously close to Openness Theology in every one of his

analyses of prophetic utterances and in every argument he uses against

preterism. Anyone who is familiar with the writings of Open Theists

can see the source material for Pratt’s arguments. If his arguments

were not directly reproduced from Sanders and Pinnock, he has clearly

drunk from the same well as those men.


According to Pratt, even if Jesus Himself bluntly declared, “Verily I

say unto you, I will return in August of the year AD 70,” that would not

mean that His return actually occurred when He said it would (122).

His return could still be in our future, because His church could have

failed to repent and be faithful, and this “human contingency” could

have caused Him to delay His return for two thousand years, or even a

trillion years.


Who knows? Human contingency could also have caused Him to

change the way the promise of His return was supposed to be fulfilled.

Maybe He originally meant for His return to be fulfilled literally but

then human contingency caused Him to fulfill it spiritually, or vice versa.

In Pratt’s paradigm, even the eschatological predictions of Jesus and

the New Testament writers become ultimately meaningless.


Pratt’s notion that we can have no confidence in Jesus’ predictions

and time statements is the same contingency-based, changing-mindof-

God nonsense of the Openness heretics. Pratt asserts that he is not

of the same cloth as these men, yet he seems to channel John Sanders as

his primary source without ever citing him. Pratt’s language could have

been pulled out of Sanders’ The God who Risks. In fact the very categories

of possible fulfillment that Pratt advocates appear to be lifted from

that very book.[3] Let us compare the statements in Sander’s Openness

volume to the same categories and modes of prophetic interpretation in

Pratt’s so-called “Reformed” response to preterism.


From Sanders: “A prophecy may express God’s intention to do

something in the future irrespective of creaturely decision.” He uses

Isaiah 46 as an example (Ibid., 51).


Sanders here expresses what Pratt calls “sworn predictions”

(WSTTB, 131). For Pratt these prophecies take the form of divine oaths

(135). For both Sanders and Pratt this category of prophecy includes

those things which God has said he will do and which will come to pass

as God said they would. Pratt is arbitrary in classifying prophecies in

this category, automatically assuming any prophecy preterists claim as

being fulfilled could not possibly fit into this category.


From Sanders: “A prophecy may also express God’s knowledge that

something will happen because the necessary conditions for it have

been fulfilled and nothing could conceivably prevent it.” He uses Pharaoh

and Moses as an example (51).


Sanders here expresses what Pratt calls “confirmed predictions”

(WSTTB, 131). For Pratt, as with Sanders, these predictions are accompanied

by specific words calling God to the outcome or by certain

signs that show nothing could conceivably prevent the fulfillment of the

prophecy (134). It is impossible to determine why the clear words of

Jesus and of the New Testament writers about the imminent Second

Coming and resurrection and judgment of the dead do not constitute

such predictions.


From Sanders: “A prophecy may also express what God intends

to do if certain conditions obtain.” He uses Jeremiah 18 as an example

(TGWR, 51).


Sanders here expresses what Pratt calls “conditional predictions”

(WSTTB, 131). Pratt says: “There are many examples in the Bible of

situations where the contingency of human choice made a difference in

the fulfillment of a prophetic prediction” (129). By “difference,” of course,

Pratt means that even though God prophetically “predicts” an event, man,

through his choices, can cause the “failure” (152) of that divine “prediction.”

Notice for Pratt who acts, and who reacts after God issues a divine

“prediction.” In reality, as we’ve already stated, conditional if/then prophecies

(such as Isaiah 1:9–20) are not predictions at all. They are warnings

and offers.


From Sanders: “The typical prophecy expresses God’s intention

to act a certain way, depending on what his creatures decide to do”

(TGWR, 53). He uses Jonah as an example.


Sanders here expresses what Pratt calls “unqualified predictions”

(WSTTB, 131). He states that even though these prophecies use unqualified

language they are not necessarily fixed in stone. And just like

Sanders, he uses Jonah as an example. According to Pratt, Jonah gave

a prophetic “prediction” and God caused the fulfillment of the “prediction”

to be delayed (131). But again, as Pratt himself admits, such “predictions”

are not predictions. They are warnings/threats and offers of blessings.


There can be precedent in the Reformed community for Pratt’s and

Sanders’ four-fold division of prophecies, but only with the understanding

that not all prophecies are predictions. Pratt’s contention that actual

“predictions” (not merely prophetic warnings and offers) of God can

be thwarted by human actions has absolutely no place in Reformed or

Reformed preterist theology.


Lastly, only the Openness theologians make any claim that the New

Testament prophecies of the Second Coming are contingent, or not

necessarily to come about as stated. There are disagreements about

what is stated, but never disagreements in the Reformed community

about whether they are actually to be fulfilled as stated. Pratt departs

from the Reformed tradition in his application of contingency to prophetic

predictions, and especially when he applies contingency to the

New Testament predictions concerning Christ’s Parousia.


House of Cards Divided


Pratt’s deconstruction of Deuteronomy 18:22 leads to a morass of sophism

in prophetic interpretation. He tears the foundation out from under

any eschatological claims whatsoever, not the least of which are those of

his fellow contributors. There is no reason to claim postmillennialism,

amillennialism, premillennialism, or any form of prophetic ism if Pratt is

correct. His chapter throws the entire remainder of the Mathison book

into the vast shifting ocean of subjectivity. If prophetic predictions can

be fulfilled in any way, or in no way at all, as Pratt claims, then we have a

plurality of possibilities, with no possibility of a unified argument of truth

versus error. Biblical prophetic predictions become vain babblings and

worthless because we cannot know with certainty if fulfillment has occurred,

or even if it will ever occur.


Faith becomes arbitrary because we can never know with certainty

which of the things God has predicted will come to pass and which are

destined for the trash heap of unfulfilled predictions due to human-enacted

contingencies. If we cannot fully know which divine predictions

may reach fulfillment and which ones need not be taken seriously, then

how can we put our faith in any of God’s predictions?


Pratt’s argument invalidates all the anti-preterist arguments of his

co-authors. For instance, Gentry criticizes preterists for the way we see

prophecies concerning the resurrection fulfilled (28), while Pratt tells us

that it is possible that prophecies can be fulfilled in ways that actually

contradict the prophecy as it was written. If Pratt is correct, then Gentry

cannot be confident that the prophecies concerning the resurrection

of the dead will be fulfilled as they were written.


There can be no real hope because we cannot tell with certainty

which prophecies of God constitute a promise/oath and which do not,

and we cannot tell with certainty what historical contingencies may or

may not obtain to prevent any given prophecy from being fulfilled. Will

there be a resurrection of the dead? Who knows? In the Prattian paradigm,

we can only wonder what human actions may alter the timing or

completeness or nature or even the existence of fulfillment.


Will Christ return literally and physically on a cloud, as argued by

the authors of WSTTB? Or will human contingencies cause Him to

alter the fulfillment of His prediction and cause Him to return in the

form of a great teacher in the Middle East? Was Mohammed the Second

Coming of Christ? Did Mohammed reflect a change in the Second

Coming due to human actions? Who can really know for sure in Pratt’s

horrific contingency paradigm of uncertainty?


Charles Hill asks:


How could it possibly be that the very people who were

taught about the consummation of redemptive history by

the apostles, and who lived through this consummation,

missed the great event when it happened? (105)


Likewise, Doug Wilson says that if preterism is true then:


. . . the apostles spent a great deal of time preparing the

early church for a world-shattering event, but then, when

it happened, the early church completely missed it. (276)[4]


If we believe Pratt, then the result is even worse than what Hill and

Wilson are saying about the historical implication of preterism. If Pratt

is right, then it is possible that the consummation has been fulfilled

in a radically different way than the prophecies themselves predicted.

The consummation could have been totally and absolutely missed on

a wholesale level because it bore no resemblance whatsoever to the actual

prophecies. Within Pratt’s paradigm, we are necessarily left forever

wondering if this event or that event was the fulfillment, or if the fulfillment

will ever happen at all.


What Pratt refrains from stating explicitly is that human contingency

can alter the fulfillment of a prophecy so much that those who

read the prophecy could be unable to recognize its fulfillment when it

happens. Prattian contingencies make the fulfillment of prophecy absolutely

uncertain. The consummation of redemptive history could be

fulfilled in any way at all. The wording of the predictions is irrelevant.


Mathison says that, “if Scripture can be trusted, the visible return of

Christ is something that literally remains to be seen” (188). In Mathison’s

view, God will certainly do what He prophetically predicted He

will do. Pratt’s view, in contrast, makes Scripture a jumble awaiting human

actions to sort out what can be believed.




It is time to stop believing in theological pluralism as anything

more than a temporary stopgap. It is time to reject the idea of

the equal ultimacy of incompatible theological positions. Premillennialism,

postmillennialism, and amillennialism are theologically

incompatible. God cannot be pleased with all three. At

least two of them should be discarded as heretical, if not today,

then before Christ comes in final judgment. (A Defense of (Reformed)

Amillennialism, Prof. David J. Engelsma)[5]


Preterists know why the three incompatible eschatological positions

are tolerated in the Reformed community. They are placeholders

for the biblical truth of preterism. When the truth is allowed to

replace these flawed systems of theology, then eschatological unity can

be achieved.


If there is no agreement as to what eschatological truth is, beyond

two or three points, how can there be certainty that preterists are

wrong? If preterism is error, where is the certainty of the truth which

shows it to be so? The lack of unity in message, methodology, and interpretation

of prophecy makes any Reformed response to preterism not

only tentative and incomplete, but premature.


WSTTB is a source of comfort to me and to other preterists. The

manifest inability of scholars within the Reformed community to organize

a coordinated, logical, and non-contradictory argument against

preterism is telling. Their eschatological house is divided and falling,

just like the Papal See fell under the weight of the truth of the Protestant



WSTTB shows nothing other than a disoriented theological base

that men are desperate to maintain. I cannot judge their hearts, but

I can judge the system for what it is. Some of the best minds of the

Reformed futurist community came together and no two of them can

agree on even the fundamental questions of the nature of prophecy,

how prophecy is fulfilled, which verses apply to past events, and which

(they claim) apply to yet future events.


In the end, Pratt reveals the crack in the Reformed, eschatological

House of Usher. The willingness of Pratt’s co-authors to unite with his error,

and with each other’s errors, in order to ward off the persistent challenge

of preterism is resulting in the sure and imminent fall of futurism.


And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds

blew, and burst against that house; and it fell, and great was its

fall. (Matt. 7:27)

[1] Open Theism holds that God does not exhaustively know the future and

that His prophetic predictions can be thwarted by the will of man. 

[2] Keith Mathison seemed to favor the Reformed view in his chapter, saying

that “in some circumstances, prophesied judgment can be averted” (163).

Mathison avoided Pratt’s error. Mathison did not say, “In almost every instance,

God’s predictions have been averted.” Later in his chapter however,

Mathison implies that Pratt’s view is actually a viable option, saying that preterists

have “failed” to consider it (181). 

[3] The God who Risks (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1998), 51–53 

[4] See David Green’s response to Hill in this book for an invalidation of

this argument. 

[5] Available online at:

Openness Futurism 73


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Mike Sullivan